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THE JUDICIAL STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 
THRESHOLD DECISIONS· 
Thomas E. Shea·· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The EIS Requirement 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)1 re-
quires responsible officials of all agencies of the Federal Govern-
ment to include a detailed statement in every recommendation or 
report on proposals for legislation and other major federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.· The 
requirements for such environmental impact statements (EIS's) as 
they have come to be known, are outlined by section 102 of 
NEPA. a Further binding guidance regarding the preparation of 
such statements is provided by the implementing regulations of 
the Council on Environmental Quality which were promulgated in 
an effort to establish uniform procedures for insuring agency com-
pliance with the procedural provisions of NEPA.· 
The requirement for the preparation of an environmental impact 
statement is the cornerstone of NEPA's procedural requirements. 
Although the preparation of a legally sufficient impact statement is 
• The opinions expressed in thia article are those of the author and do not necessarily 
represent those of any Federal agency. 
•• District Counsel, Corps of Engineera, Galveston District. 
I 42 U.S.C. II 4331-4332 (1970). 
• 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). 
• 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i)-(v) (1970). 
• 40 C.F.R. II 1500-08 (1979). 
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not the only mandate of NEPA, these statements do serve as the 
principal mechanism for insuring that the Federal Government 
complies with the underlying policy of the Act. In instances where 
an agency is not required by NEPA to prepare an environmental 
impact statement, it still has obligations under the Act to study 
and develop appropriate alternatives as well as to recognize the 
continuing responsibility of the Federal Government with regard 
to environmental considerations under section 101. As the Su-
preme Court has recognized, however, such environmental con-
cerns need not necessarily be elevated over other appropriate con-
siderations in the selection of a course of action by a federal 
agency.-
Although the universe of NEPA is not inclusive in the impact 
statement provisions, preparation of an environmental impact 
statement is the procedural focus of the Act and has certainly 
proved to be the center of attention. The requirement for an envi-
ronmental impact statement effects NEPA's express purpose to 
imbed an early formal consideration of environmental impacts in 
major agency decisions.· Because of this, the threshold decision 
regarding the necessity for preparing an EIS is of profound 
importance.' 
It is not surprising that in light of the importance of such EIS 
threshold decisions, the issue has been heavily litigated. Courts 
have not hesitated to insure that "the duty NEPA imposes upon 
the agencies to consider environmental factors not be shunted 
aside in the bureaucratic shuftle."8 It has been argued that without 
the full disclosure reuired by NEP A for major federal actions, 
there exists no sound basis to evaluate the environmental aspects 
of a project.· 
The EIS requirement is not, however, the only basis for environ-
mental consideration of an action under NEPA. Agencies are re-
quired to prepare environmental assessments for proposed actions 
which are not covered by categorical exclusions.1o The environmen-
• Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, _ U.S. _, 62 L.Ed 2d 433 (1980). 
• Citizens for Responsible Area Growth v. Adams, 477 F. Supp. 994, 998 (D. N.H. 1979). 
7Id. 
e Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivera Aas'n of Okla., 426 U.S. 776, 787 (1976). 
• Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(MPIRG I). 
II 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (a) and (b) (1979). A categorical exclusion is one which normally 
does not require either an environmental impact statement or an environmental assessment. 
These categorical exclusions are defined by the agencies in their regulations implementing 
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tal assessment is then used to make a determination whether to 
prepare an environmental impact statement.ll If the agency deter-
mines that an environmental impact statement is required, the 
scoping process is commenced, leading to the preparation of the 
statement.12 If the agency determines that based upon the environ-
mental assessment an EIS is not required, it must then prepare a 
finding of no significant impact (FONSI) which must be made 
available to the affected public.13 In certain limited circumstances 
where the proposed action is similar to one which normally re-
quires the preparation of an environmental impact statement or 
the nature of the proposed action is without precedent, the FONSI 
must be made available for public review for thirty days before the 
agency makes its final determination.14 An environmental assess-
ment also serves as an aid in assuring compliance with NEPA's 
other requirements, such as considering alternatives, when an EIS 
is not prepared. 11 
The purpose of this article is to consider the standard for judi-
cial review used by the courts in deciding whether an agency deci-
sion not to prepare an impact statement complies with the man-
date of NEPA. Consideration of this question must first involve 
looking at the policy and purpose of the Act. Section II is a funda-
mental exploration into the requirements of NEPA and especially 
the meaning of the phrase "major Federal actions significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment." This discussion 
will be general, for the focus of this article is not on the interpreta-
tion of that phrase but rather on the standard which the courts 
have applied in reviewing agency compliance with the mandate. In 
order to explore that standard for review Section III will examine 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for statutory guidance. 
Section IV will consider four Supreme Court decisions relating to 
the standard for judicial review of agency decisions in the context 
the CEQ regulations. As an eXanlple, categorical exclusions for the U.S. Army Corps of En-
gineers are set forth in 33 C.F.R. §§ 230.7 and 230.8. These exclusions include certain feasi-
bility studies which may be sufficiently analyzed and reviewed through the preparation and 
circulation of an environmental assessment. Another categorical exclusion is required for 
responding to emergency situations where action is necessary to prevent or reduce risks to 
life, health, or property, or severe economic losses. 
11 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(c) (1979). 
11 ld. § 1501.4(d). 
II ld. § 1501.4(e)(i). 
If ld. § 1501.4(e)(2). 
" ld. § 1508.9. 
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of the APA and environmental law. The views expressed by each of 
the circuit courts on the appropriate standard for judicial review of 
EIS threshold decisions will be discussed in Section V. Coming out 
of this tangle of contradictory cases, the article will conclude with 
some observations of the standard for review based upon the previ-
ous discussion. 
B. The Policy and Purpose of NEPA 
The main purpose for preparing an environmental assessment is 
to insure that the agency makes an informed and conscious deci-
sion regarding the EIS threshold question. There are actually two 
components of this purpose. First, the assessment assures that the 
agency has given adequate consideration to the question at hand 
and that it is correctly applying the statutory standard. Second, it 
provides a focal point for judicial review of the decision, providing 
the court with the benefit of the agency's expertise.le 
The requirement for an environmental assessment underscores 
the important nature of the threshold determination, but it does 
more. The environmental assessment also forces the agency to in-
vestigate and analyze the environmental consequences of its ac-
tions even in many cases where a more extensive environmental 
impact statement is not prepared. The requirement for an environ-
mental assessment therefore results in formal consideration of en-
vironmental factors in many proposed actions which do not consti-
tute major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment. 
The genesis of detailed and analytical environmental assess-
ments is found, at least in part, in Hanly v. Mitchelll7 where the 
court noted than in making the threshold determination under sec-
tion 102(C) of NEPA the agency must affirmatively develop a re-
viewable record in lieu of limiting itself to perfunctory 
conclusions. l • 
An environmental impact statement performs two primary func-
tions: (1) to serve as an environmental disclosure statement by de-
tailing the environmental effects of a proposed federal action in 
order to enable those who do not have a part in its compilation to 
I. Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
17 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, Hanly v. Kleindienst, 409 U.S. 990 (1972) 
(Hanly I). 
II [d. at 647. 
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understand and consider meaningfully the factors involved,19 and; 
(2) to compel the decisionmaker to give serious consideration to 
environmental factors in making discretionary choices and to help 
insure the integrity of the process of decision by precluding stub-
born problems or serious criticism from being swept under the 
rug.so 
Consistent with this purpose, judicial review of agency compli-
ance with the procedural requirements of NEP A is consistently 
rigorous. This judicial scrutiny is nowhere more apparent than in 
the review of agency decisions regarding the necessity for the prep-
aration of impact statements. Because of the importance of these 
threshold determinations, much effort has been given to develop-
ing law to guide the decision process. Before exploring the stan-
dard for judicial review in this area, it is first necessary to summa-
rize the substantive criteria which have emerged. 
II. NEPA's REQUIREMENT OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT FOR "MAJOR FEDERAL ACTIONS SIGNIFICANTLY 
AFFECTING THE QUALITY OF THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT" 
NEPA requires the preparation of an EIS for major federal ac-
tions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment.21 The statute itself provides no guidance regarding the 
meaning of this mandate and the legislative history is equally un-
informative. U Although the basic mandate for the preparation of 
.. Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975); Environmental Defense Fund v. 
Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d l123, l136 (5th Cir. 1974). 
I. Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1284-
85 (lst Cir. 1973); Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 
1972). 
11 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970) . 
•• H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st. Sess. 
(1969); CONF. REP. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2751-73. 
Most of the legislative history involves the necessity for establishing the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality. Section 102 is based on the Senate bill. There was no comparable provi-
sion in the House version. The discussion of Section 102 in the legislative history (Confer-
ence Report 91-765) was largely concerned with the conference substitution of the phrase 
"to the fullest extent possible" and the deletion of the House provision providing that noth-
ing in this Act shall increase, decrease or change any responsibility or authority of any Fed-
eral official or agency created by other provision of law. The discussion of Section 102 did 
not mention what "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment" means. Specifically, regarding Section 102(c) the Congress was only concerned 
with the coordination requirements and not the types of actions which would require an 
impact statement. 
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an EIS has been called one of "uncommon clarity"28 the precise 
meaning of that mandate and its application are not clear.2" The 
language of NEPA has also been referred to as "opaque".211 It has 
been the responsibility of the courts to fashion and forge an inter-
pretation in the context of the cases which have been litigated. 
Because of the importance of the phrase "major Federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" the 
courts have found it necessary to parse the statutory language 
word by word. This section will consider the interpretation given 
to the words in this phrase by decisions of the courts and regula-
tions of the Council on Environmental Quality. 
A. Unity or Duality-Interpreting "Major" and "Significantly" 
Together or Independently 
The phrase "major Federal actions significantly affecting the 
human environment" can be read in either of two ways. It can be 
approached as a unitary standard compelling the conclusion that a 
federal action is major so long as the action relates to a significant 
effect on the human environment. IS Alternatively, it can be inter-
preted as a dual standard requiring the determination of the mag-
nitude of the federal action as well as the significance of the 
effect. I? 
In support of the unitary approach, the court in Minnesota Pub-
lic Interest Research Group v. Butzl8 has stated that by bifur-
cating the statutory language, it would be possible to speak of a 
minor federal action significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment and, therefore, to find the EIS requirement 
inapplicable. The thrust of the unitary approach is to concentrate 
attention on the significance of the action and to assume that if the 
effect is significant it is axiomatic that the action is also major. 
On the other side, some courts have found that "major Federal 
.a Citizens for Responsible Area Growth v. Adams, 477 F. Supp. 994, 998 (D. N.H. 1979) . 
•• Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973) 
(Hanly II) . 
•• City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) . 
•• City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 673 n.15 (9th Cir. 1975); Minnesota Public 
Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1321-22 (8th Cir. 1974); Wyoming Outdoor 
Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973) . 
• 7 NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 584 F.2d 619 (3rd Cir. 1978); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 
F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972); See Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 
1027, 1032-33 (7th Cir. 1972). . 
•• 498 F.2d 1314, 1321-22 (8th Cir. 1974). 
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action" and "significantly affecting" are distinct requirements and 
that a proper analysis requires separate consideration of each/" It 
is argued that the two-pronged approach follows the statutory lan-
guage more closely and that since the unitary approach gives virtu-
ally no effect to the word "major," it runs contrary to the require-
ment that a court give meaning to all words of a statute when 
construing it.30 
The CEQ regulations adhere to the unitary approach31 although 
separately defining "major Federal action"32 and "significantly."33 
This represents a reversal from the earlier CEQ guidelines which 
stated that major and significantly were "intended to imply thresh-
olds of importance and impact that must be met before a state-
ment is required."" Since the Supreme Court has not yet ad-
dressed this issue there is no definitive answer to the unitary-
duality controversy. 
B. When Is an Action "Federal"? 
Under either the unitary or duality approach a determination 
must be made concerning whether the action is federal. This seem-
ingly straightforward inquiry has proved to be less certain in its 
application. It has been determined that there is federal action 
within the meaning of NEPA not only where an agency proposes to 
build a facility itself, but also in some cases where an agency 
makes a decision which enables action by a private party which 
will affect the quality of the environment. 311 
This enabling analysis has been applied to find sufficient in-
volvement to trigger the EIS requirement where the federal gov-
ernment grants licenses and permits to private parties,38 approves· 
•• Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972). 
8. NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 584 F.2d 619 (3rd Cir. 1978). 
8' 40 C.F.R. Parts 1500-08, Comments on § 1508.17 (1979). 
a. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1979). 
a. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1979) . 
.. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(c) (1977) . 
•• Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973). It 
should be noted, however, that at least two recent cases have found that the necessity of 
obtaining a federal permit for a small part of a private project does not federalize the entire 
project. Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1980); Save the Bay, 
Inc. v. United States Corps of Engineers, 14 ERC 1456, _ F.2d _ (5th Cir. 1980) . 
.. See e.g., Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d 
Cir. 1971). 
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a lease of land to private parties,8'/' or approves and funds a high-
way construction project.88 The nexus is sufficient to require an 
EIS even where an agency makes a decision which permits some 
other party to develop a technology which could affect the 
environment ... 
A significant factor in these federal enablement cases involves 
the question of an agency's discretion with regard to a proposed 
action. Section 102 of NEP A requires compliance "to the fullest 
extent possible."'o The courts have interpreted this narrowly, find-
ing that the limit of this directive is reached when NEP A conflicts 
with an existing statutory scheme.41 Because of this limitation, 
compliance with NEPA is not required where an agency has no 
discretion to apply and is obligated to act by law." NEPA will not 
make discretionary an action which was mandatory prior to its en-
actment'" and where an individual has acquired rights that must 
be legally recognized, NEPA will not operate to remove those 
rights." 
The premier case dealing with the question of statutory conflict 
in the NEPA arena is Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Riv-
ers Association 0/ Oklahoma." The petitioner was a land develop-
ment company which filed a statement of record with the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under the 
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act.'· The statement of re-
cord was required under the Act before Flint Ridge could sell lots 
in interstate commerce. After the statement was filed respondents 
petitioned HUD ·to prepare an environmental impact statement 
before allowing the statement of record to go into effect. HUD re-
jected this request and the respondents filed suit. The district 
court found that HUD's action of allowing the statement of record 
to go into effect constituted major federal action requiring an 
a. See e.g., Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972). 
II See e.g., Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1972). 
II Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973) . 
.. 42 U.S.C. I 4332(1) (1969) . 
.. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519,548 (1978); Flint Ridge 
Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Au'n of Okla., 426 U.S. 776, 788 (1976) . 
•• Milo Community Hospital v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 144, 148 (1st Cir. 1975); NRDC v. 
Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925, 935-36 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
• a Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975) . 
•• Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973) . 
•• 426 U.S. 776, 786 (1976). See text at notes 135-141 infra . 
•• 15 U.S.C. II 1704-1705 (1974). 
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EIS." The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court, reasoning 
that the real estate development would have substantial environ-
mental consequences and finding that the case was similar to those 
in which a federal agency grants a license, approves a project, or 
supplies funding or financial guarantees.4B . 
The case was reversed by the Supreme Court in an opinion by 
Justice Marshall. The Court found no basis in the Disclosure Act 
to permit the Secretary to suspend the time demands of the stat-
ute in order to allow preparation of an impact statement.·' Be-
cause of this, there was a "clear and fundamental conflict of statu-
tory duty," making NEPA's EIS requirement inapplicable.IIO 
The CEQ· regulations attempt to define in general terms the 
boundaries of federal action, including new and continuing activi-
ties involving programs entirely or partly financed, assisted, con-
ducted, regulated or approved by federal agencies. III 
Such actions generally fall into one of four categories: (1) adop-
tion of official policy such as rules, regulations, interpretations 
under the AP A, treaties and international conventions or agree-
ments, and formal documents establishing policies which will re-
sult in or substantially alter agency programs; (2) adoption of for-
mal plans, such as official documents prepared or approved by 
federal agencies which guide alternative uses of federal resources 
upon which future agency actions will be based; (3) adoption of 
programs, such as a group of concerted actions to implement a pol-
icy or plan and decisions allocating resources to implement a pro-
gram or directive, or; (4) approval of specific projects such as con-
struction or management activities including action approved by 
permit or regulatory decision and federally assisted activities.1I1 
Also of interest have been those cases in which it has been urged 
that a lack of action by the Federal Government should trigger the 
EIS requirement. In one instance the District Court for Alaska dis-
agreed with an earlier decision of the District Court for the District 
of Columbia and held that the failure of a federal agency to object 
to a wolf hunt in Alaska did not constitute federal action and thus 
"Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Olda. v. Lynn, 382 F. Supp. 69 (E.D. Qkla. 1974) . 
•• Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Okla. v. Lynn, 520 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1975) . 
•• Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Okla., 426 U.S. 776, 791 (1976). 
10 Id. 
II 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a) (1979). 
"' Id. § 1508.18(b) (1979). 
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a environmental impact statement was not required. G8 It has also 
been held that EPA's failure to object to the issuance of a state 
NPDES permit does not require an EIS.&4 The reasoning behind 
this position is that the term "action" under NEPA only means 
affirmative action and thus refraining from taking action does not 
come within the purview of the Act.1I11 The Council on Environmen-
tal Quality has taken a contrary position, finding that actions "in-
clude the circumstance where responsible officials fail to act and 
that failure to act is reviewable by courts or administrative tribu-
nals under the Administrative Procedure Act or other applicable 
law as agency action. "116 
C. What Is A "Major" Action? 
The threshold question as to whether there is a major federal action 
requiring NEPA compliance is not presented in the majority of cases; 
there is little question that when the federal government commits mil-
lions of dollars to build dams, nuclear power plants, or highways that 
there is a major federal action.1I7 
A significant minority of cases has, however, found it necessary 
to discuss the meaning of "major" in the NEP A context. For those 
courts that adhere to the duality approach in the interpretation of 
"major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment," a determination must be made that the fed-
eral action is major as well as significant in order to necessitate an 
EIS. The search for usable standards to determine what is major 
has proven illusive. In general the resolution has depended on a 
case by case analysis guided by rather flexible standards. 
In Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Hackensack Mea-
dowlands Development Commission,1I8 the court resorted to that 
.. Alas. v. Andrus, 429 F. Supp. 958 (D. Alas. 1977). In Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 
627 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1980) the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
agreed with the position of the Alaska court and reversed the decision of the District of 
Columbia District Court . 
.. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Va. State Water Control Bd., 453 F. Supp. 122 
(E.D. Va. 1978). An NPDES permit is a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
permit issued by either a state or the Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean 
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1970). 
An NPDES permit is also known as a Section 402 permit. [d. § 1342. 
II Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Va. State Water Control Bd., 453 F. Supp. 122, 
125 (E.D. Va. 1978); Alas. v. Andrus, 429 F. Supp. 958, 962-63 (D. Alas. 1977) . 
.. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1979). 
17 Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1319 (8th Cir. 1974). 
IS 464 F.2d 1358 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1118 (1973). 
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ever-present judicial helper, the reasonable man, to set the stan-
dard for determining whether approval of the construction of a 
liquid natural gas facility by the Federal Power Commission was 
major action. The court first undertook a general factual analysis, 
taking into consideration that the facility had been in operation for 
a considerable period, that it was an expansion of an existing facil-
ity, that there was no expenditure of any federal funds and that 
there was no taking of any public lands.18 Having made these ob-
servations the court found that "approval of the construction of 
the facility is certainly not the type of 'action' which most reason-
able men would conclude, without any guidelines, to be either 'ma-
jor' or even an 'action'. "80 
This type of general analysis is typical of the area.81 Because of 
the lack of guidance in NEP A and its legislative history the courts 
have had to develop an implementing common law based primarily 
on broad policy· considerations, limiting the requirement of an EIS 
to those federal actions of "superior, larger and considerable im-
portance . . . . "81 In large part the decision is a judgement based 
on the circumstances of the proposed action.88 
The original CEQ guidelines attempted to clarify the issue by 
equating major with controversial, stating that "[p]roposed major 
actions, the environmental impact of which is likely to be highly 
controversial, should be covered in all cases."" In Hanly v. Klein-
dienst,81 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that "contro-
versial" refers to cases where a "substantial dispute exists as to the 
size, nature or effect of the major federal action rather than to the 
existence of opposition to a use, the effect of which is relatively 
undisputed."" Judge Friendly disagreed in a dissenting opinion, 
stating that he found no basis for the limited reading which the 
majority applied.87 The "likely to be highly controversial" test did 
not, at any rate, prove to be useful and was dropped from the new 
CEQ regulations' definition of "major'''' but has been retained as a 
•• [d. at 1366. 
10 [d. at 1367 . 
• 1 See NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 584 F.2d 619 (3rd Cir. 1978) . 
•• Julis v. City of Cedar Rapids, 349 F. Supp. 88, 89 (N.D. Iowa 1972) . 
.. Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 n.7 (5th Cir. 1973) . 
.. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(a) (1977) . 
.. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972) . 
.. [d. at 830 . 
.. [d. at 838-39 (Friendly, J. dissenting) . 
.. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1979). 
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sub-factor in the consideration of what is "significant."slI 
D. When Does an Action «Significantly" Affect the 
Environment? 
The quest for the meaning of significant is most properly intro-
duced with a quotation from Judge Friendly's dissent in Hanly v. 
Kleindienst. 
While I agree that determination of the meaning of "significant" is a 
question of law, one must add immediately that to make this determi-
nation on the basis of the dictionary would be impossible. Although all 
words may be "chameleons, which reflect the color of their environ-
ment," C.I.R. v. National Carbide Corp., 167 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 
1948) (L. Hand, J.), "significant" has that quality more than most. It 
covers a spectrum ranging from "not trival" through "appreciable" to 
"important" and even "momentous."70 
The fact that the chameleon-like creature is evasive has not pre-
vented its being chased on a regular basis throughout the NEP A 
decisions. Agencies, lawyers, judges and commentators have 
launched campaign after campaign attempting to catch and define 
the "significant" chameleon only to later find it has again changed 
its color in the context of another case and slipped away. The basis 
of the problem arises from a lack of guidance from the Act and its 
legislative history. As with the term "major" the courts have found 
themselves pretty much on their own in deciding what is meant by 
"significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.''7l 
As a starting point, almost every major federal action, no matter 
how limited in scope, has some effect on the human environment.'1I 
While Congress could have imposed the EIS requirement on all 
major federal actions, it did not. The addition of the word "signifi-
cantly" must mean something; but what?73 
One of the most influential statements concerning this question 
was proffered by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Hanly v. 
Kleindienst74 which was on appeal to the circuit court for the sec-
•• [d. § 1508.27(b)(4). 
7. 471 F.2d 823, 837 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J. dissenting). 
71 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970); See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 
1972). 
7' Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972). 
71 [d . 
.. [d. at 830-31. 
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ond time.7Ii In that case the General Services Administration 
(GSA) was proposing to construct an annex including two twelve 
story buildings, one an office building and the other a jail, to the 
U.S. Courthouse in Manhattan. Appellants contended that GSA 
was required to prepare an impact statement. In its decision the 
Court of Appeals approached the question by formulating stan-
dards for determining whether an action significantly affects the 
quality of the human environment. 
[T]he agency in charge, although vested with broad discretion, should 
normally be required to review the proposed action in the light of at 
least two relevant factors: (1) the extent to which the action will cause 
adverse environmental effects in excess of those created by existing 
uses in the area affected by it, and (2) the absolute quantitative ad-
verse environmental effects of the action itself, including the cumula-
tive harm that results from its contribution to existing adverse condi-
tions or uses in the affected area. 'I. 
Based upon these standards, the case was remanded for additional 
findings of fact. 
The CEQ regulations take an even more detailed approach in-
cluding standards for both the context and intensity of the effects 
of the proposed action.7'1 Context means that the significance of an 
action must be analyzed in several settings such as the society as a 
whole, the affected region, the affected interests and the locality." 
As a result, significance varies with the setting of the proposed ac-
tion.'1s Both short-and long-term effects are considered relevant as 
context. so 
The second consideration is intensity, which refers to the sever-
ity of the impact bearing in mind that more than one agency may 
make decisions about partial aspects of a major action.s1 An evalu-
ation of intensity should consider: (1) beneficial and adverse im-
pacts; (2) the degree to which the proposed action affects the pub-
lic health and safety; (3) unique characteristics of the geographic 
area; (4) the degree to which the effects are likely to be highly con-
.. The first appeal was Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, Hanly 
v. Kleindienst, 409 U.S. 990 (1972) (Hanly I). 
70 Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830-31 (2d Cir. 1972). 
77 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1979). 
71 Id. § 1508.27(a). 
7. Id. 
I·Id. 
Ol Id. § 1508.27(b). 
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troversial; (5) the degree of uncertainty or the involvement of 
unique or unknown risks; (6) the degree to which the action may 
be a precedent; (7) the cumulative effects anticipated; (8) effects 
on significant scientific, cultural or historic resources; (9) adverse 
effects on any endangered or threatened species or its habitat, and; 
(10) violation of federal, state or local environmentallaws.81 
These criteria should be welcomed by the courts, agencies and 
public as an effort to bring some semblance of order to the thresh-
old determination process. They do not constitute a magic formula 
which can be applied in an automatic and entirely objective man-
ner because the underlying concepts of environmental protection 
do not lend themselves to such easy analysis. The CEQ approach 
does, however, offer a workable framework for thoughtful analysis 
which can assist the decisionmaker in reaching a threshold de-
termination concerning the necessity of preparing an impact 
statement. 
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
Because NEP A itself does not address the question of judicial 
review of agency procedures or determinations under the Act,88 it 
is necessary to look to the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A) for 
guidance." 
Section 702 or-the APA provides that "[a] person suffering legal 
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved 
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is enti-
tled to judicial review thereof. "81 The actions judicially reviewable 
under the AP A are agency actions which are made reviewable by 
statute and final agency action for which there is no adequate rem-
edy in a court.8' By virtue of section 701 the review provisions ap-
ply to agency actions except to the extent that: (1) statutes pre-
clude judicial review, or; (2) agency action is committed to agency 
discretion by laW.87 It is particularly this mandate of section 701 
which makes the AP A provisions applicable to judicial review of 
agency actions under NEPA.88 
•• [d. § 1508.27(b)(1)-(10) . 
•• See text at notes 21-22 supra . 
.. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 6362, 7562 (1970) . 
.. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970) . 
.. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970) . 
.. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970) . 
.. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). 
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The AP A manifests a congressional intention that it cover a 
broad spectrum of administrative actions.8e Accordingly, the Su-
preme Court has held that the APA's "generous review provisions" 
must be given hospitable interpretationeo and that only upon a 
showing of clear and convincing evidence of contrary legislative in-
tent should the courts decline to apply the APA's judicial review 
provisions.e1 Section 559 of the APA provides that a subsequent 
statute may not be held to supersede or modify its judicial review 
provisions except to the extent that the subsequent statute does so 
expressly. ell The purpose of this section and the sections on judicial 
review was to remove obstacles to judicial review of agency actions 
under subsequently enacted statutes.es 
It is against this forceful backdrop that the applicable standards 
for judicial review of agency actions under NEPA must be viewed. 
The presumption is strongly in favor of the application of the AP A 
to all agency actions including those under NEPA and unless there 
is a statutory prohibition or in cases where agency action is com-
mitted to agency discretion by law, the APA judicial review provi-
sions apply to NEPA." Although the question of the applicability 
of the APA is easily answered, the determination of its applicabil-
ity is fundamental to determining the appropriate standard for ju-
dicial review of agency threshold decisions under NEP A and the 
applicability of the AP A to such cases must be recognized. 
Once it has been determined that the AP A is applicable, the 
next step is to explore the scope for judicial review which is set out 
in the statute. A reviewing court is empowered by section 706 to 
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret statutory provisions 
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an 
agency action to the extent necessary.el In fulfilling its responsibil-
ities of review the court shall: 
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 
delayed; and 
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclu-
sions found to be -
•• Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). 
00 Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955) . 
• , Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962) . 
•• 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1970) . 
•• Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955) . 
.. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) . 
•• 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). 
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(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law; 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or 
short of statutory right; 
(D) without observance of procedure required by law; 
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 
556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute; or 
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject 
to trial de novo by the reviewing court. 
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the 
whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall 
be taken of the rule of prejudicial error." 
This then is the standard for judicial review required by the AP A. 
The inquiry does not, however, stop here. These standards must be 
applied to the NEPA process and examined to determine their sig-
nificance with respect to the EIS threshold decision process. 
Under section 706(1) a court can compel agency action unlaw-
fully withheld or unreasonably delayed." When administrative in-
action has the same impact on the rights of a party as denial of 
relief, an agency cannot preclude judicial review by casting its de-
cision in the form of inaction rather than in the form of an affirma-
tive decision denying relief." Thus action under section 706 is ap-
propriate for those situations where the agency has failed to take 
appropriate action" such as the preparation of an EIS. 
In most instances, however, the agency will prepare an -environ-
mental assessment.lOO Where the assessment results in a negative 
threshold determination judicial review would be more proper 
under section 706(2) which compels a court to hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found not to meet 
any of six enumerated standards.lol 
The first of these is the most important, encompassing actions 
which are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
" 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970) . 
.. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1970). 
" Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
" EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prod. Co., 385 F. Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd in part, 
rev'd in part on other grounds, 530 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 1976). 
'00 See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3 (1979) . 
• 0. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1970). 
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not in accordance with law. lOS This is a highly deferential standard 
which requires affirmance of the agency's decision if a rational ba-
sis exists to support that decision. loa In general terms this review 
standard has been interpreted as requiring the reviewing court to 
consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the 
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of 
judgment. IN 
From a different perspective, this standard does not mean that 
agency action may be set aside as arbitrary or capricious because 
the judge would have decided the matter differently. 1011 Where an 
official performs an act within the permissible limits of his author-
ity, a court may not find that the act is arbitrary or capricious.loe 
To this end the arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial review 
should be applied flexibly, particularly where an agency is dealing 
with a question that is one of judgment or prone to uncertainty. 1M 
The second category to justify setting aside agency action under 
section 706(2) is where the action is contrary to constitutional 
right, power, privilege, or immunity.l08 When a party brings suit 
under this provision the court has jurisdiction to inquire into the 
preliminary question of whether judicial vindication of the alleged 
rights is appropriate in the given procedural setting, and, if so, 
whether these rights have been and how they should be re-
dressed.lOll AB far as the EIS process is concerned, this standard 
has less potential application because of the relative absence of 
constitutional issues in such cases. 
There is also not much potential for the use of the thir<l stan-
dard-in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, 
or short of statutory rights.110 The decision that an EIS is not re-
quired could be challenged under this standard by alleging that the 
decision is in excess of statutory limitation. Such an attempt 
In 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). 
1 .. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). 
1 .. Chrysler Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972); See also Bowman 
Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Beat Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281 (1974); American Meat Inat. v. 
EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975). 
1.. Calcutta East Coast of India and East Pakiatan/United Statea of America Conference 
v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 399 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
1" Wilson v. Watson, 309 F. Supp. 263 (D. Kan. 1968), al/'d, 422 F.2d 866 (10th Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970). 
107 Dow Chem. Co. v. Blum, 469 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Mich. 1979). 
1" 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (1970). 
1 .. Coca-Cola Co. v. FTC, 475 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 877 (1973). 
lIO 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1970). 
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would, however, probably fail because of the clearly accepted prin-
ciple that under NEPA an agency does have the power to make the 
determination, at least initially, regarding whether an EIS is neces-
sary.l11 The real question is not whether the agency exceeds its au-
thority under NEPA in making the threshold determination but 
rather whether that determination can stand in light of the other 
review standards of section 706. 
The fourth standard, requiring observance of procedure required 
by law, is potentially a much more fruitful area of contention and 
deserves more judicial consideration than it has thus far received. 
While the courts have not hesitated to invalidate EIS threshold 
decisions because of a lack of procedural compliance, they have 
usually not articulated that they were doing so under authority of 
the APA.llJ It has been noted, however, that this standard is appli-
cable to NEPA in the context of determining the adequacy of an 
impact statement. 118 
The fifth standard deals with agency actions which are unsup-
ported by substantial evidence.ll4 Review under the substantial ev-
idence test is authorized only when agency action is taken pursu-
ant to a rulemaking provision of the APA lUI or where the action is 
based on a public adjudicatory hearing. us These are narrow and 
specifically limited situations.u7 
The threshold determination regarding the preparation of an im-
pact statement does not constitute either rulemaking or an action 
based on a public adjudicatory hearing. Under the APA, "rule" 
means an agency statement of general or particular applicability 
and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe 
law or policy"'s Except when notice or hearing is required by 
statute, the rulemaking procedures do not apply to interpretive 
111 Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1319 (8th Cir. 1974); 
Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 1973); Save 
Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 464 (5th Cir. 1973). 
111 Arizona Pub. Servo Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Scientists' Inst. for 
Pub. Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1094-95 (D. C. Cir. 1973); Hanly v. Klein-
dienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). 
111 Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975). 
114 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970). 
"" 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). 
111 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1970); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 
402, 414 (1971). 
117 Id.; see also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 
(1976). 
"8 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970). 
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rules.u , At most, EIS threshold determinations are interpretive 
rules exempt from the rulemaking provisions of section 553 of the 
AP A since NEPA does not require notice or hearing for such 
determinations. 
An EIS threshold determination also does not constitute an ac-
tion based upon a public adjudicatory hearing. The CEQ regula-
tions call for the involvement of environmental agencies and the 
public but there is no requirement in the regulations or in NEPA 
for a public adjudicatory hearing.llo Accordingly, there is no basis 
for the application of the substantial evidence test to EIS thresh-
old determinations. 
The sixth, and last, standard for review under the AP A is for 
actions which are unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the 
facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. III De novo 
review of whether an agency decision is unwarranted by the facts is 
authorized in only two circumstances: (1) when the action is adju-
dicatory in nature and the agency factfinding procedures are inad-
equate, and; (2) when issues that were not before the agency are 
raised in a proceeding to enforce nonadjudicatory agency action.lll 
Since neither of these situations exists with respect to the thresh-
old decision regarding an impact statement, the standard is not 
applicable. 
The result of this analysis of the provisions of section 706 of the 
APA is that a court shall hold unlawful and set aside EIS thresh-
old determinations which are found to be arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law or 
which are made without observance of procedure required by law. 
Other than under these standards for judicial review, the APA 
offers no applicable basis to set aside an agency EIS threshold 
determination. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT: REVIEW OF THE REVIEWERS 
A. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe 
The question of judicial review of administrative action was ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton 
ne 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1970). 
110 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) (1979). 
III 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (1970). 
III Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971). 
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Park v. Volpe. 123 The suit concerned a challenge to the decision of 
the Secretary of Transportation approving a route for construction 
of an interstate highway in Memphis, Tennessee. Under the De-
partment of Transportation Act, section 4(f);114 the Secretary 
could not approve any program or project which required the use 
of any publicly owned land from a public park or recreation area 
unless there was no feasible and prudent alternative and unless the 
program included all possible planning to minimize the harm. In 
making his decision to approve the route through a park area, the 
Secretary did not indicate why he believed that there was no feasi-
ble and prudent alternative or why design changes could not be 
made to reduce the harm to the park.12II 
The focus of the Court's decision concerned the standard for ju-
dicial review under the AP A. As a preliminary matter the Court 
determined that the APA was applicable. Under the APA agency 
action is subject to judicial review except where there is a statutory 
prohibition or where agency action is committed to agency discre-
tion by law. ISS The decision summarily held that there was no indi-
cation that Congress sought to prohibit judicial review and that 
the decision of the Secretary did not fall within the "committed to 
agency discretion" exception since there was law to apply.127 As a 
result, the AP A was applicable. 
Justice Marshall then turned his attention to the question of the 
applicable standard for review under section 706 of the AP A. The 
Court stated that even though de novo review of the case was not 
authorized and the decision did not have to meet the substantial 
evidence test, the standards of section 706 require a reviewing 
court to "engage in substantial inquiry."11I8 While the decision was 
entitled to a presumption of regularity, this "presumption is not to 
shield his action from a thorough, probing, in-depth review."llle 
In explaining the correct posture of a reviewing court Justice 
Marshall stated that a court is first required to decide whether the 
decisionmaker acts within the scope of his authority. To do this 
the reviewing court must be able to find that the decisionmaker 
••• 401 U.S. 402 (1971) . 
• 14 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970). 
II' Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 407 (1971). 
II. See text at notes 85-122 infra. 
II. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410-413 (1971). 
II. [d. at 415. 
II. [d. 
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could have "reasonably believed" the conclusions reached. ISO Scru-
tiny of the facts also requires a finding that the choice made was 
not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law under section 706(2)(A) of the APA. The 
Court cautioned that although this inquiry into the facts is to be 
searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow 
one which does not empower a court to substitute its judgment for 
that of the agency.l3l 
In essence the Court adopted a reasonableness standard for de-
termining whether the agency acted within the scope of its author-
ity while simultaneously calling for the use of the APA's arbitrary, 
capricious standard for reviewing the actual decision. The distinc-
tion is important. Both involve an inquiry concerning the facts but 
the scope of authority question is tied to the statute while the ac-
tual decision is based on consideration of "relevant factors" and 
"judgment. "lSI 
The final inquiry of the Court concerned whether the Secretary's 
action followed the necessary procedural requirements. The Court 
found that formal findings of fact were not required and the case 
was remanded to the District Court for a review of the administra-
tive record.lS8 
Although the Overton Park case does not involve NEPA, it is 
nevertheless relevant to the inquiry concerning the proper stan-
dard for judicial review of EIS threshold decisions. The focus of 
attention on the APA review standard demonstrates the Court's 
commitment to application of the standard to agency decisions in-
volving environmental concerns. The broad language of the deci-
sion left little doubt that the AP A governs the judicial review of 
such cases and that environmental concerns do not call for a differ-
ent standard for judicial review.l84 
B. Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association 
In Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association181 
the Supreme Court had to decide whether an environmental im-
pact statement was required before the Department of Housing 
·'10 [d. at 416. 
'"' [d. 
'II [d. at 417. 
'II [d. at 420. 
'14 [d. at 410-12. 
'II 426 U.S. 776 (1976). 
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and Urban Development (HUD) could allow a disclosure statement 
filed by a private real estate developer pursuant to the Interstate 
Land Sales Full Disclosure Actl " to become effective. Under the 
Disclosure Act such statements become effective automatically 
thirty days after filing unless the Secretary notifies the developer 
that the statement is incomplete or inaccurate. The Secretary has 
no power to evaluate the substance of the developer's proposal and 
if the statement is on its face complete .and accurate, the Secretary 
must permit it to go into effect. 11" The Tenth Circuit deemed it 
immaterial that the Secretary had only limited discretion to reject 
statements under the Disclosure Act and held that the preparation 
of an EIS was required by NEPA.1I8 
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, finding it incon-
ceivable that an EIS could be filed within the thirty day limit for 
automatic effectiveness of disclosure statements under the Disclo-
sure Act. Based upon this the Court found that the Disclosure Act 
leaves no discretion to the Secretary to suspend the effective date, 
thereby resulting in a "clear and fundamental conflict of statutory 
duty."lIe Although the Court did not articulate a standard for judi-
cial review, the decision demonstrates the attitude of the Court to 
be restrained in imposing the EIS requirement in cases where 
there is a clear conflict between NEPA and a statute under which 
agency action is taken. 
Since this case was essentially one of statutory interpretation the 
Court was free to determine the issue for itself. 140 It is apparent 
that because of this, the Court felt it had no reason to articulate 
the standard for judicial review. The review standards of section 
706(2) of the AP A are not applicable to such questions of statutory 
interpretation. 141 
C. Kleppe v. Sierra Club 
The Court also addressed the threshold EIS decision issue in 
Kleppe v. Sierra Club. In Several environmental organizations sued 
, .. 15 U.S.C. II 1701-1720 (1970). 
"' Id. § 1706(b). 
, .. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Asa'n, 520 F.2d 240 (10th. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 
U.S. 776 (1976). 
, •• Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Asa'n, 426 U.S. 776, 791 (1976) • 
... 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). 
,., Id. 
'.1 427 U.S. 390 (1976). 
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the Department of Interior and other federal agencies to compel 
the preparation of a regional environmental impact statement 
before allowing further development of federal coal reserves in the 
Northern Great Plains region. The Department of Interior had 
conducted studies of the potential for coordinated development of 
electric power and resource development in the Northern Great 
Plains. The Department had also recently prepared a Coal 
Programmatic EIS to consider the environmental effects of the 
coal leasing program on a national scope. No EIS had been pre-
pared, however, to cover the coal leasing program of the Northern 
Great Plains region. 
The action at bar arose over the Department's approval of four 
coal mining plans in the Powder River Coal Basin. Impact state-
ments had been prepared on these plans. The environmental orga-
nizations argued that an EIS of regional scope should have been 
prepared. This comprehensive EIS would consider the cumulative 
impacts of the coal leasing program on the entire region. 
The Court found that there was no evidence of an action or pro-
posal for action of a regional scope and that a regional environ-
mental impact statement is required only where there is such a 
proposal.l48 The Court rejected the use of a balancing test in such 
cases, holding that: 
The procedural duty imposed upon agencies by this section is quite 
precise, and the role of the courts in enforcing that duty is similarly 
precise. A court has no authority to depart from the statutory language 
and, by a balancing of court-devised factors, determine a point during 
the germination process of a potential proposal at which an impact 
statement should be prepared. Such an assertion of judicial authority 
would leave the agencies uncertain as to their procedural duties under 
NEPA. would invite judicial involvement in the day-to-day decision-
making process of the agencies, and would invite litigation. I •• 
The emphasis on limiting judicial involvement was manifested 
by the Court in its statement of the standard for judicial review. 
Discussing this issue the Court noted that the determination with 
respect to an EIS threshold decision requires the weighing of a 
number of relevant factors and that resolving these issues requires 
a high level of technical expertise which is properly left to the in-
, •• [d. at 400-04. 
, •• [d. at 406 (emphasis in decision). 
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formed· discretion of the responsible federal agencies.1411 
Justice Powell directly addressed the standard for judicial re-
view, stating: 
Respondents conceded at oral argument that to prevail they must show 
that petitioners have acted arbitrarily in refusing to prepare one com-
prehensive statement on this entire region, and we agree. 
Absent a showing of arbitrary action, we must assume that the agen-
cies have exercised this discretion appropriately. I .. ' 
D. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC 
The general attitude of the Supreme Court with regard to the 
scope of judicial review of agency actions affecting the environment 
was demonstrated in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. 
NRDC.147 The case involved two separate decisions of the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia. In the first the court re-
manded a decision by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to 
grant a nuclear power plant operating license to Vermont Yankee 
Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee).14. In the second case the 
court remanded to the AEC its decision to grant a construction 
permit to Consumers Power Co. (Consumers Power) for two nu-
clear reactors.14• 
At the hearing on the Vermont Yankee operating license the 
AEC excluded from consideration the issue of the environmental 
effects of operations to reprocess fuel or dispose of wasteS.llIO Later, 
the AEC instituted rulemaking procedures to deal with the ques-
tion of the fuel cycle effects on the environment and a spent fuel 
cycle rule was adopted. The AEC also ruled that since the environ-
mental effects of the fuel cycle were shown to be relatively insignif-
icant it was unnecessary to apply the spent fuel cycle rule to envi-
ronmental reports submitted prior to its effective date or a final 
environmental impact statement for which a draft EIS was circu-
lated prior to the effective date of the rule.11I1 The court of appeals 
invalidated the spent fuel cycle rule because of perceived inade-
Itl [d. at 412. 
I.e [d. 
In 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
I., NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
'" Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
110 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 528 (1978). 
III [d. at 528-30. 
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quacies in the rulemaking proceedings and remanded the license 
for further procedings. lIII 
In the Consumers Power case the AEC issued a final EIS which 
did not consider the fuel cycle issue and also did not consider en-
ergy conservation as an alternative to the proposed project. After 
the final EIS had been filed the CEQ issued new guidelines which 
mentioned for the first time the necessity of considering energy 
conservation as one of the alternatives to be addressed in an im-
pact statement.lla The Commission declined to reopen the pro-
ceedings to consider energy conservation alternatives on the 
grounds that they did not meet a threshold test of reasonable-
ness.IN The circuit court rejected the position of the AEC, holding 
that the EIS was fatally defective for failing to examine energy 
conservation as an alternative and that the fuel cycle issue was 
controlled by the Vermont Yankee case, requiring remand.1I1 
Speaking for all seven participating justices, Justice Rehnquist 
expressed concern that the circuit court had "seriously misread or 
misapplied the statutory and decisional law cautioning reviewing 
courts against engrafting their own notions of proper procedures 
upon agencies entrusted with substantive functions by Con-
gress. "1118 In strong, unequivocal language the Court reversed and 
remanded both cases. 
The Supreme Court sounded the continually repeated theme 
that absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling cir-
cumstances, agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of 
procedure and methods of inquiry.1I7 The Court also held that the 
AP A establishes maximum, not minimum, procedural require-
ments in conducting rulemaking procedures. liS Justice Rehnquist 
concluded that nothing in the APA or NEP A permits a court to 
review and overturn a rulemaking proceeding so long as the agency 
employs at least the "statutory minimum" procedures. III 
Turning to a broader framework, the Court left no doubt that it 
viewed agencies, not courts, as the primary decisionmakers in the 
NEPA-AP A arena . 
.. I NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 641, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976) . 
.. I 38 Fed. Reg. 20,550 (1973). 
'14 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 533 (1978). 
'" Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
, .. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 525 (1978). 
, •• [d. at 543-44. 
, .. [d. at 524. 
'" [d. at 548. 
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NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but 
its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural. It is to insure a 
fully informed and well-considered decision, not necessarily a decision 
the judges of the Court of Appeals or of this Court would have reached 
had they been members of the decisionmaking unit of the agency. Ad-
ministrative decisions should be set aside in this context, as in every 
other, only for substantial procedural or substantive reasons as man-
dated by statute, not simply because the court is unhappy with the 
result reached. 110 
These cases reveal a cautious attitude of the Court with respect 
to judicial review of agency decisions. It is evident that the Court 
is concerned with insuring that agencies comply with the require-
ments of law in their decisional processes which affect the environ-
ment. Equally clear, however, is the fundamental recognition by 
the Court of the authority and latitude in decisions delegated to 
the agencies by Congress. The Court sends an unmistakable signal 
that it is the role of the agency and not the reviewing court to 
make the decisions as long as the agency complies with the statu-
tory requirements. The fact that a court would make a different 
decision in a situation is not sufficient justification for reversing 
the agency's determination. The function of a reviewing court is 
important but limited. 
v. TOURING THE CIRCUITS 
Before delving into an exploration of the various positions 
adopted by the circuit courts of appeals it is only fair to alert the 
reader that disagreement is the order of the day. There is a defini-
tive and irreconcilable split in authority. Not only have the circuits 
reached different conclusions regarding the appropriate standard 
for judicial review of EIS threshold decisions, but even among 
those circuits which have adopted similar standards there are a va-
riety of rationales used to reach those conclusions. 
A. The First Circuit 
Although the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has not 
taken a stand on the question of the standard for review of EIS 
threshold decisions, some of the district courts have. In Essex 
County Preservation Association v. Campbell l • l the court adopted 
,eo 1d. at 558 (citations omitted) .. 
'" 399 F. Supp. 208 (D. M888. 1975). 
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the standard of reasonableness noting only that: "The 'rule of rea-
son' should prevade judicial construction of NEPA."182 The same 
judge, sitting in New Hampshire instead of Massachusetts, subse-
quently reaffirmed this position, noting that he would continue to 
apply this standard until told otherwise by the First Circuit or Su-
preme COurt.18S The court's reasoning was apparently based on 
general policy considerations and the court's concern with the en-
vironment. The decision emphasized that the preparation of an 
impact statement is, perhaps, the most essential and vital stage of 
the NEPA process and that the determination that a statement is 
not required must be closely scrutinized because of the possibility 
of avoiding the intensive environmental examination directed by 
Congress through NEPA.l84 
In Aersten v. Landrieu181 it was noted that the Supreme Court's 
decision in Kleppe v. Sierra Club188 might foreclose the use of the 
reasonableness standard. In view of the weight of authority at the 
district level in the First Circuit, however, the court chose to apply 
the reasonableness standard.18" 
B. The Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit has extensively discussed the standard for 
judicial review issue in Hanly v. Kleindienst (Hanly 11).188 Essen-
tially, the court adopted the arbitrary, capricious standard and 
elaborated on the specific criteria to be applied by a reviewing 
court. 
In Hanly II the court distinguished the meaning of the word 
"significantly" in NEP A as a question of law and the issue of 
whether a proposed action will have a significantly adverse envi-
ronmental impact as a question of fact.18e Accordingly, the court 
viewed its function as a reviewing court to determine de novo all 
relevant questions of law, and with respect to the agency's factual 
determinations, "to abide by the Administrative Procedure Act, 
which limits us in matters not involving any agency's rule-making 
, •• [d. at 216. 
, •• Mount Vernon Preservation Soc'y v. Clements, 415 F. Supp. 141, 146 (D. N.H. 1976). 
'14 [d. at 145-46. 
II. 488 F. Supp. 314 (D. Mass. 1980). 
, .. 427 U.S. 390 (1976). 
, •• Aersten v. Landrieu, 488 F. Supp. 314, 321 (D. Mass. 1980). 
, .. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). 
,n [d. at 828. 
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or adjudicatory function to determining whether its findings are 
'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law' or 'without observance of procedure required 
by law' .... "170 
The essential question is whether an EIS threshold determina-
tion is a question of law or of fact. The decision pointed out that 
where a court's interpretation of statutory language requires some 
appraisal of the facts, a neat delination of the legal issues for the 
purpose of judicial review may prove impossible or, at least, in-
advisable. l7l The Supreme Court has authorized a simpler, more 
practical standard for the review of such mixed questions of law 
and fact-the "rational basis" test under which the decision of the 
agency is upheld if it has "warrant in the record" and a "reason-
able basis in law."l7lI 
Notwithstanding the availability of the rational basis standard 
the court adopted the arbitrary, capricious .standard of the APA 
since the meaning of the term "significantly" as used in NEP A can 
be isolated as a question of law.178 Finding support in Overton 
Park, the court saw no reason for applying a different approach 
since the AP A standard permits effective judicial scrutiny of 
agency action while also permitting the agency to have some dis-
cretion to use its expertise in applying the law to specific factual 
contexts.17• 
This approach solves the mixed question of law and fact prob-
lem by bifurcating it into its two components. The analysis leaves 
the question of interpreting the meaning of NEP A to the court to 
determine de novo while allowing the agency wide discretion in ap-
plying that meaning, as judicially interpreted, to a specific factual 
situation. As long as an agency uses the court's interpretation of 
the law in making its threshold EIS decisions, it will be given 
broad discretion and its determination will be reviewable only 
under the arbitrary, capricious standard. Even where the proposed 
action is within the "grey area" where the meaning of NEPA is 
insufficient to provide a clear and absolute standard of decision, an 
... [d . 
... [d. at 829 . 
... NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944) . 
... Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 
(1973) . 
... [d. at 829-30. 
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agency threshold determination will be upheld.17II 
C. The Third Circuit 
91 
Acknowledging the sharp split of authority fueled by the mixed 
fact and law nature of the question, the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania has faced the standard of review issue178 without benefit 
of guidance of its circuit court, which has not squarely addressed 
the question. The opinion of the district court gave note to the 
curious nature of the law-fact problem: 
The definition of the terms "major" and "significant" is a matter of 
law; all well and good! The rabbit in the hat is that the findings which 
are the sine qua non before deciding that question of law, are of neces-
sity Findings of Fact which we must make. Hence, the circle goes 
round. 177 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals had previously skirted the 
threshold standard issue, stating in dictum that the approval for 
construction of a facility was not the type of action which "most 
reasonable men would conclude, without any guidelines to be ei-
ther 'major' or even 'action'. "178 The district court interpreted this 
as at least an indication that the circuit court leaned toward the 
reasonableness standard.l78 
The district court also analyzed the Overton Park decision, argu-
ing that although the Supreme Court recited the AP A standard it 
had actually applied a reasonableness standard.110 It is true that 
the Court did use a reasonableness standard but only with respect 
to determining whether the agency had acted within the scope of 
its authority-a question of law. 111 For review of the actual deci-
sion of the agency, a question of fact, the Court adopted the APA 
arbitrary, capricious standard. 111 
171 Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. United States, 573 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1978). 
lO. Township of Ridley v. Blanchette, 421 F. Supp. 435 (E. D. Penn. 1976). 
17'1 Id. at 444 (emphasis in decision). 
171 Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n, 464 
F.2d 1358, 1367 (3rd. Cir. 1972). 
In Concord Township v. United States, 625 F.2d 1068, (3rd Cir. 1980), the court stated 
that it had not resolved the standard of review issue but noted that there is much to be said 
in favor of "higher scrutiny" or review. The court found it unnecessary, however, to resolve 
the question in the case at bar. 
171 Township of Ridley v. Blanchette, 421 F. Supp. 435, 445 (E.D. Penn. 1976). 
110 Id. 
III Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416-17 (1971). 
III Id. 
92 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 9:63 
D. The Fourth Circuit 
The Fourth Circuit has addressed the function of judicial review 
under NEP A, adopting the standard of the AP A.18s Interpreting 
Overton Park, the court summed up the review process by stating 
that a court is to consider first whether the agency has acted 
within the scope of its authority and, second, whether the ultimate 
decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law.l84 The Fourth Circuit explained 
that in applying this standard a court must engage in substantial 
inquiry, determining whether the agency made a good faith judg-
ment after considering all relevant factors.18D 
Because the court addressed the standard of review issue in the 
context of a decision to issue a permit after an environmental im-
pact statement had been prepared, it did not specifically address 
the EIS threshold question. The court appears to favor a narrow 
scope of review under NEPA and does not indicate that it would 
apply a different review standard to other NEPA contexts such as 
threshold determinations. 
E. The Fifth Circuit 
In Save Our Ten Acres v. Kregerl88 the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit determined that the spirit of NEP A "would die 
aborning if a facile, ex parte decision that the project was minor or 
did not significantly affect the environment were too well shielded 
from impartial review."18' Accordingly, the court found that the 
threshold decision must be subject to a more searching standard 
under which a court must determine whether the plaintiff has al-
leged facts which, if true, would show that the project would meet 
the NEP A criteria. If so, a reviewing court should examine and 
weigh the evidence of both the plaintiff and the agency to deter-
mine if the decision was reasonable.188 This inquiry is not limited 
to consideration of the administrative record. The court has a fur-
ther duty to consider other evidence including supplemental affida-
vits and depositions if it can be shown there was an inadequate 
.ea Coalition for Responsible Regional Dev. v. Coleman, 555 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1977). 
'84 [d. at 399 . 
• ea [d. at 400 • 
... 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973). 
II. [d. at 466 . 
... [d. at 466-67. 
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evidentiary development before the agency.18B 
In developing this standard the Fifth Circuit stated that it found 
solid support for its position in the Overton Park decision.180 Not-
ing that the Supreme Court had made it clear that the ultimate 
merit decision should be reviewed under the arbitrary, capricious, 
abuse of discretion standard, the Save Our Ten Acres court found 
that a thorough study of Overton Park teaches that a more pene-
trating inquiry should be used for determining the entryway deter-
mination of whether all relevant factors have been considered by 
the agency. The Fifth Circuit rejected as overly formalistic the ar-
gument that the reasonableness standard is applicable only if the 
statute expressly conditions the exercise of authority upon a deter-
mination that certain prerequisites are met.lBl In a later decision, 
however, the court indicated that its adoption of the reasonable-
ness standard was made necessary by its concern for the spirit of 
NEP A, without reference to Overton Park.lB2 
F. The Sixth Circuit 
Contrary to the position adopted by the Fifth Circuit, the Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Ohio, in the Sixth Circuit, 
relied upon Overton Park to reject the reasonableness standard. In 
Faircrest Site Opposition Committee v. LevilB3 the district court 
stated that the AP A standards as defined in Overton Park have 
been consistently applied in environmental casesl" and that under 
the AP A, judicial review is limited to determining whether there 
was substantial evidence in the administrative record and whether 
the decision was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.lBI 
The decision did not explain the rationale for the application of 
the substantial evidence test. As noted by the Court in Overton 
Park, review under the substantial evidence test is authorized only 
when the agency action is taken pursuant to a rulemaking provi-
sion of the AP A or where the action is based on a public adjudicat-
, •• [d. at 467. 
'00 See text at notes 123-33 supra. 
,., Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973). 
'" Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973). 
, •• 418 F. Supp 1099 (N.D. Ohio 1976). 
'H See Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973); Morningside Renewal Council, Inc. v. 
AEC, 482 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 951 (1974). 
, .. Faircrest Site Opposition Committee v. Levi, 418 F. Supp. 1099, 1103 (N.D. Ohio 
1976). 
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ing hearing,l88 neither of which situations existed in the Faircrest 
case. The district court's adoption of the arbitrary, capricious stan-
dard is in line with one of the two main approaches to the thresh-
old review issue, the other main approach being the reasonableness 
standard. The court's use of the substantial evidence test, however, 
stands alone and without support. 
G. The Seventh Circuit 
The position of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals is very 
similar to that of the Second Circuit. In fact, in First National 
Bank of Chicago v. Richardson, un the court expressly patterned its 
decision after the earlier and factually similar Second Circuit case 
of Hanly v. Kleindienst (Hanly 11).188 Like Hanly II, the National 
Bank of Chicago case developed from a proposed federal detention 
center, this one in Chicago. On the basis of an environmental as-
sessment, GSA had concluded that its construction would not sig-
nificantly affect the quality of the human environment. The Sev-
enth Circuit was considering a challenge to this agency decision. 
After detailing the factual similarities between the Chicago 
center and the center in Hanly II, the court considered the general 
policies behind NEP A, finding that environmental considerations 
mandate a balancing and weighing of multiple factors in order to 
determine the cumulative and absolute effects of the project. 1 .. 
The court's discussion of the law was very brief in comparison to 
its discussion of the facts, indicating that it considered the thresh-
old decision to be essentially a factual one. This was confirmed by 
the the review standard which it adopted, holding that the agency 
"determination must stand unless its findings are arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law or without observance of procedure required by law."·oo Al-
though this is the same standard used in Hanly II, to which the 
court had made constant reference in its factual analysis, the court 
did not cite Hanly II or any other authority and offered no discus-
sion of the issue. The Seventh Circuit stands at the high water 
mark in regarding the EIS threshold determination as a purely fac-
tual matter. 
1M See text at notes 114-17 supra. 
1" 484 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1973). 
1" See text at notes 168-74 supra. 
1 .. First National Bank of Chicago v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369, 1380 (7th Cir. 1973) . 
• oo [d. at 1381. 
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H. The Eighth Circuit 
The Eighth Circuit, not impressed by the factual nature of the 
EIS threshold decision, holds that such a decision should be re-
viewed on the grounds of its reasonableness.JOt Although adopting 
the arbitrary, capricious standard for reviewing substantive deci-
sions to proceed with a project after an EIS has been prepared, it 
has rejected this standard for the EIS threshold decision. 
In reaching this position the court rightly states that not only is 
NEP A an environmental full disclosure law but that it was also 
intended to effectuate substantive changes in decisionmaking. JOJ 
The court is primarily concerned with the action-forcing effect of 
an EIS, without which there is no basis for evaluation of the envi-
ronmental effects of a proposed action. In view of such preclusion 
and because of the concern for environmental disclosure present in 
NEPA, the Eighth Circuit holds that an agency's discretion as to 
whether an impact statement is required is properly exercised only 
within narrow bounds. loa 
To upset an agency's determination not to prepare an EIS, a 
plaintiff must show that the determination was not reasonable 
under the circumstances. This requires only a showing that a pro-
ject could have significant effects.IOf 
1. The Ninth Circuit 
The emphasis in the Ninth Circuit is on a low threshold test, 
review of which is under the reasonableness standard. City of Da-
vis v. Colemanlo, exemplifies the concern whiCh the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit has for assuring that federal agencies 
properly exercise their role in determining whether an impact 
statement is necessary. The appeal related to a proposed freeway 
interchange which had been planned by the State of California and 
was being built with the help of federal funding under the author-
ity of the Federal Highway Administration.IOI 
Although the avowed purpose of the interchange was to replace a 
temporary access to meet safety standards, the court determined 
••• Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1974) . 
••• Id. at 1320 . 
•• a Id . 
... Id . 
... 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975) . 
... Funding was authorized by the Federal Aid-Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-156 (1966). 
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that the real purpose was to stimulate and service future industrial 
development in the area.IO? The court showed no hesitation in 
delving into the history and mechanics of the project in order to 
look behind the administrative record and satisfy itself with regard 
to the facts. In this pursuit the decision labeled the negative 
declaration as cursory, inadequate, a mere accessory accommoda-
tion to inevitable development and finally, as "bureaucratic 
doubletalk. "108 
The court reviewed this negative declaration in light of a review 
standard which "does not require the courts to determine whether 
a challenged project will in fact have significant effects. Rather, we 
are to determine whether the responsible agency has 'reasonably 
concluded' that the project will have no significant adverse envi-
ronmental consequences. "Ioe 
The case is informative, not only because of its holding on the 
standard of review issue, by virture of which it is in the main-
stream of the "reasonableness" proponents, but also because it so 
well illustrates the concern of the court in considering decisions 
which affect the environment. To such courts environmental chal-
lenges are not simply run of the mill cases. Instead, they merit spe-
cial attention and a probing, in-depth review. The articulation in 
such decisions of the reasonableness standard, as opposed to the 
arbitrary, capricious standard, is not simply a matter of academic 
interest. It stands for something: the activist attitude of the court. 
J. The Tenth Circuit 
An activist attitude is also evident in the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. The Tenth Circuit maintains that a threshold EIS deci-
sion is not one of discretion such as agencies have in innumerable 
matters and which is referred to in the general terms of section 
706(2)(A) of the APA.110 Stressing that the sweep of NEPA is ex-
traordinarily broad, 111 the court has stated that it is convinced that 
the compass of an agency's judgment is narrow and a threshold 
determination must be reasonable in light of the mandatory re-
... City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 1975). 
108 [d. at 669. 
- [d. at 673 (emphasis in decision) . 
• 10 Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973). 
111 This language is from Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1122 
(D.C. Cir. 1971). 
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quirements and high standards set by NEP A/m 
Explaining this conclusion, the court reasons that the discretion 
given to agencies under section 706 of the APA, although applica-
ble to some other agency decisions, does not apply to an EIS 
threshold determination under NEP A. 213 
Under the specific terms of NEPA we feel that the proper standard, as 
stated earlier, is whether the negative determination was reasonable in 
the light of the mandatory requirements and high standards set by the 
statute so as to be "in accordance with law" -another ground of review 
in 706(2)(A) which may be applied consistently with the procedural 
demands of NEPA.llt 
Unfortunately the court did not divulge the "specific terms of 
NEP A" it was referring to. Without such guidance it is difficult to 
find them. 
K. The District of Columbia Circuit 
Consistency and clarity have not been the touchstones of the 
District of Columbia Circuit regarding the threshold review stan-
dards to be applied. The circuit court's initial analysis of the ques-
tion is found in Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning 
Commission v. United States Postal Service,m. a case involving a 
suit to stop the construction of a bulk mail center because an im-
pact statement had not been prepared. In addressing the review of 
the environmental assessment, which found no significant environ-
mental effects, the court outlined three criteria to be applied: first, 
whether the agency took a hard look at the problem as opposed to 
making bald conclusions unaided by preliminary investigation; sec-
ond, whether the agency identified the relevant areas of environ-
mental concern, and; third, whether the agency made a convincing 
case that the impact is insignificant.218 The court also held that an 
agency must provide convincing reasons why a project with argu-
ably potentially significant impact does not require an EIS. 
Stressing that in cases involving genuine issues of environmental 
effects there is a relatively low threshold for impact statements, 
I .. Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1249 (lOth Cir. 1973) . 
.. 8 ld . 
.. < ld . 
... 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
I" ld. at 1040. 
98 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 9:63 
the court remanded the case for additional findings. 217 Although 
discussing the threshold review question in terms of the burden of 
proof, the D.C. Circuit did not state what the standard of the re-
view should be. 
In Committee for Auto Responsibility v. Solomon218 the court 
did address the review standard issue. In fact, it addresed it twice 
in the opinion, arriving at a different conclusion on each occasion. 
In its first analysis of the EIS threshold issue the court relied upon 
Kleppe v. Sierra Clubl1e to state: "An initial agency determination 
on this matter is judicially vulnerable only when the agency has 
abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily."2IO A page later the court 
adopted a different posture: "NEP A's call for an EIS is governed 
by the rule of reason,"1I1 this time citing Vermont Yankee Power 
Corp. v. NRDC as authority from the Supreme Court. The con-
texts of these quotations does not provide a basis for distinguish-
ing the choice or use of the two standards. 
The only consistent explanation to reconcile this opinion is to 
say that there is no difference: that the arbitrary, capricious stan-
dard is the same as the rule of reason or reasonableness standard. 
This is precisely what the District of Columbia District Court did 
in Peshlakai v. Duncan.111 Faced with a challenge to an agency 
decision not to prepare an impact statement the district court 
held: "Such a decision will be reversed by a court only if it is un-
reasonable or arbitrary and capricious. "118 It is of interest to note 
that the court cited decisions from circuits other than its own in 
support of each of the standards. II. The court did, however, cite 
the D.C. Circuit case of Maryland-National Capital Park and 
Planning Commission v. U.S. Postal Servicelll when it stated that 
there does not seem to be any significant practical difference be-
tween the two standards. lie It did not mention Committee for 
117 [d. at 1040-42 . 
• ,. 603 F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
... 427 U.S. 390 (1976). See text at notes 142-46 supra . 
••• Committee for Auto Responsibility v. Solomon, 603 F.2d 992, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
•• , [d. at 1003 . 
••• 476 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1979) . 
••• [d. at 1252 . 
••• For the reaaonableneBB standard the court cited Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating 
Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973). For the arbitrary, capricious standard it 
cited Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973) . 
... See text at notes 215-17 supra . 
••• Peshlakai v. Duncan, 476 F. Supp. 1247, 1252 n.12 (D.D.C. 1979). 
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Auto Responsibility v. Solomon, which was really more on point 
because it was confusing by commission rather than omission. The 
Maryland-National case had simply avoided the question by ig-
noring the difference betweeen the two standards while in Com-
mittee for Auto Responsibility v. Solomon the court recognized 
the issue but failed to resolve it because it adopted both standards. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A perusal of the many cases which have dealt with the correct 
standard for judicial review of EIS threshold decisions reveals a 
basic difference in approach and attitude of the courts. Although it 
would be an oversimplification to attempt to neatly divide the de-
cisions into a reasonableness side and an arbitrary, capricious side, 
it is inescapable that at least there are two major lumps under the 
wool sack. As has been seen, many of the courts have attempted to 
support their positions by analyzing the AP A, and to an even 
greater extent, the previous case law. This is not surprising. What 
is surprising is the number of decisions that have avoided any at-
tempt at such analysis or have not actually relied upon the analysis 
they had made.217 It is apparent that in such cases legal analysis is 
less of a factor in the actual choice of the standard of review than 
is the general philosophical outlook of the courts toward environ-
mental protection.228 
In the absence of any guidance from NEPA itself, the standard 
for review is determined by the APA. Under the APA questions of 
law such as the meaning of "significantly affecting the quality of 
the human environment" are determined by the courts and these 
interpretations of the meaning of NEP A must be followed by the 
agencies.229 In this the agencies have no discretion after the courts 
have "laid down the law." The action of an agency with regard to 
applying that law is a different matter and the AP A provides wide 
discretion for such agency actions. This is especially true with re-
spect to EIS threshold decisions since the APA's formal rulemak-
ing and adjudicatory hearing provisions are not applicable. The re-
sult is that aside from legal questions, under the AP A threshold 
decisions can only be reversed if arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
'.7 See e.g., text at notes 165-66 and 200 supra . 
••• See e.g., Aersten v. Landrieu, 488 F. Supp. 314, 321 (D. Mass. 1980); Mount Vernon 
Preservation Soc'y v. Clements, 415 F.Supp. 141, 145-46 (D. N.H. 1976) . 
••• 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). 
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discretion or not in accordance with required procedures. Other-
wise, under the APA the court must accept the agency's determi-
nation whether or not it agrees with it. 
The only legal escape from this narrow standard of review is for 
mixed questions of law and fact. By characterizing an EIS thresh-
old decision as involving an inseparable question of law and fact 
the court's freedom to review the decision broadens. The problem 
with this, however, is that a threshold decision may not properly 
be considered as a mixed question of fact and law. 
The Supreme Court has not been inclined to view agency deci-
sions as mixed questions but rather has tended to view them as 
factual determinations.·lo The Court has often held that because of 
practical considerations, particularly the expertise of an agency, a 
decision is a question of fact.lIl In some contexts, however, espe-
cially those concerning very broad questions of policy, the Court 
has not hesitated to allow a wide standard for judicial review.ll• 
Because of the contextual nature of the Court's decisions regard-
ing the AP A and the scope of judicial review it is necessary to fo-
cus on the attitude it has taken in the environmental area. Overton 
Park demonstrates that the AP A is applicable to the environmen-
tal context. The Court bifurcated the question of judicial review, 
adopting a reasonableness standard for determining if an agency 
acts within the scope of its authority, and the arbitrary, capricious 
standard for reviewing the actual decision. Since Overton Park did 
not involve NEPA it offers no direct answer for the threshold stan-
dard of review question. Because the scope of agency authority is 
rarely a question in such threshold decisions the case does offer 
support to the application of the arbitrary, capricious standard. 
Nevertheless, Overton Park has also been cited as authority for the 
reasonableness standard.·11 
Kleppe v. Sierra Club,·" on the other hand, has not been cited 
in support of the reasonableness standard; nor could it be, for it 
-clearly calls for the application of the arbitrary, capricious stan-
dard to judicial review of comprehensive EIS threshold decisions . 
••• See Allegheny Corp. v. Breswick It Co., 353 U.S. 151 (1957); Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. 
FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945); United States v. Louisville It N.R. Co., 235 U.S. 314 (1914) . 
••• See Dobson v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 320 U.S. 489 (1943); R.R. Comm'n of Tex. 
v. Rowan It Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940) . 
• a. See Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966) . 
... Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973) . 
... 427 U.S. 390 (1970). 
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The language could scarcely be more definite and unequivocal. 
Justice Powell's words bear repeating: 
Respondents conceded at oral argument that to prevail they must show 
that petitioners have acted arbitrarily in refusing to prepare one com-
prehensive statement on this entire region, and we agree. 
Absent a showing of arbitrary action, we must assume that the agen-
cies have exercised this discretion appropriately.1S6 
There is no discemable basis for distinguishing the decision to 
prepare a regional or comprehensive impact statement from more 
specific statements. In light of Kleppe the mixed law-fact argu-
ment loses its punch. 
It is understandable that many courts feel a deep concern for 
environmental issues and it is understandable, too, that because of 
this concern they wish to insure that the agencies live up to their 
obligations under NEP A. This is especially true in light of the 
broad policy mandate which NEPA proclaims. It is apparent that 
this policy concern is the real reason for adoption of a more strict 
standard for judicial review. While this is understandable, it is not 
legally justified. Environmental cases are often hard cases but they 
do not justify bad law. As broad as the objectives of NEPA are, the 
statute offers no review standard. Under the AP A, especially when 
considered with Kleppe, the standard for judicial review is limited 
to setting aside decisions which are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law or which are 
made without observance of procedure required by law. 
la. [d. at 412. 
